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Ron Paul on the Health Reform Bill

In one of the more reasoned viewpoints on health care, Ron Paul seems to have the antidote for our health insurance woes.  Though many consider Congressman Paul to be a fringe element, the truth is that he is being embraced by millions that are simply tired of our two party system which of course is what our forefathers warned about.

He is also a doctor.   This is the transcription of a speech he gave right after health reform was passed.  See if you can find any point that you can debate.  I couldn’t.

Following months of heated public debate and aggressive closed-door negotiations, Congress finally cast a historic vote on healthcare late Sunday evening. It was truly a sad weekend on the House floor as we witnessed further dismantling of the Constitution, disregard of the will of the people, explosive expansion of the reach of government, unprecedented corporate favoritism, and the impending end of quality healthcare as we know it.

Those in favor of this bill touted their good intentions of ensuring quality healthcare for all Americans, as if those of us against the bill are against good medical care. They cite fanciful statistics of deficit reduction, while simultaneously planning to expand the already struggling medical welfare programs we currently have. They somehow think that healthcare in this country will be improved by swelling our welfare rolls and cutting reimbursement payments to doctors who are already losing money. It is estimated that thousands of doctors will be economically forced out of the profession should this government fuzzy math actually try to become healthcare reality. No one has thought to ask what good mandatory health insurance will be if people can’t find a doctor.

Legislative hopes and dreams don’t always stand up well against economic realities.

Frustratingly, this legislation does not deal at all with the real reasons access to healthcare is a struggle for so many – the astronomical costs. If tort reform was seriously discussed, if the massive regulatory burden on healthcare was reduced and reformed, if the free market was allowed to function and apply downward pressure on healthcare costs as it does with everything else, perhaps people wouldn’t be so beholden to insurance companies in the first place. If costs were lowered, more people could simply pay for what they need out of pocket, as they were able to do before government got so involved. Instead, in the name of going after greedy insurance companies, the federal government is going to make people even more beholden to them by mandating that everyone buy their product! Hefty fines are due from anyone found to have committed the heinous crime of not being a customer of a health insurance company. We will need to hire some 16,500 new IRS agents to police compliance with all these new mandates and administer various fines. So in government terms, this is also a jobs bill. Never mind that this program is also likely to cost the private sector some 5 million jobs.

Of course, the most troubling aspect of this bill is that it is so blatantly unconstitutional and contrary to the ideals of liberty. Nowhere in the constitution is there anything approaching authority for the Federal government to do any of this. The founders would have been horrified at the idea of government forcing citizens to become consumers of a particular product from certain government approved companies. 38 states are said to already be preparing legal and constitutional challenges to this legislation, and if the courts stand by their oaths, they will win. Protecting the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, should be the court’s responsibility. Citizens have a responsibility over their own life, but they also have the liberty to choose how they will live and protect their lives. Healthcare choices are a part of liberty, another part that is being stripped away. Government interference in healthcare has already infringed on choices available to people, but rather than getting out of the way, it is entrenching itself, and its corporatist cronies, even more deeply.

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Medicaid Payments on Chopping Block

As more and more doctors begin to accept the coming reality of Medicaid and Medicare cuts, you will see not only fewer doctors, but higher medical costs.  Do you have any idea how much a physician gets for an average office visit for one of these patients?  If you guessed $25, well go buy yourself a nice hat as you are correct.

Most physicians are now losing money every time a patient walks through the door after counting salaries and office expenses including outrageous malpractice premiums.  The solution?  Most doctors will end up dropping all of these patients and most are already not accepting any new patients.  And guess what?  They are getting ready to cut Medicaid and Medicare payments again right now!

Medicaid Growth

In an appeal to Congress right after a health reform meeting, Obama admitted that reimbursements rates will need to be adjusted in order to extend Medicaid to over 15 million Americans which is part of the current, ambitious health reform bill.

As of 2008, nearly 3/4 of rates paid by Medicare were less then private health insurance companies.   Right now, most doctors are only taking existing Medicaid patients not new ones.  So how on earth is the health reform bill not only going to give Medicaid to 15 million more Americans, but how are they also going to increase payouts to doctors, so that Medicaid members will not have to wait months to see a doctor?

Right now, Medicaid has 47 million members and will soon be over 60 if health reform passes.  Waits for Medicaid members for an appointment at some of our poorer city’s federally subsidized health clinic,  have lengthened to four months from six weeks in 2008 in light of the recession.

So where are all of these patients going instead of the doctor?  If you guessed the emergency room, then you should buy yourself a cane to match your hat, and by the way you are excellent at this game.   And guess who pays for these er visits?  If you guessed the people that have health insurance, then you should finish off your outfit as you got all three correct.

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Health Reform Bill Analysis

In the news today of course is the continuing saga of health reform.  In the Democrats final chess move, they are attempting to pass the Senate Health Reform bill by a process called Reconciliation which I have discussed in much detail over the last few weeks.  Usually, this process is used to pass budgets but the Democrats are using it to pass health reform, much as the Republicans used it to pass their silliness over the years.  No room here for double talk, to say anything about this procedure, would be without doubt a case of the pot calling the kettle a bastard.

In any case the text of the reconciliation act for the health care bill was posted today on the House Rules Committee Web site, and again on my site.  But this document is basically legal nonsense, and so I posted the explanation below.

For the record I am quite unsure about passing this bill, if it will be a good thing or a bad thing.  Though I am certain that doing nothing is no worse then passing this.  As the old saying goes, “if you don’t have you health, then what do you have?”  Well right now, close to 50 million have no access to health care or health insurance.  And that is disgusting.  This bill will for a fact cover at least 30 million of that 50 million.  And even if it causes the deficit to rise and our dollar to continue its long descent into the toilet of history, this can’t be bad.  Iraq and all of our Middle East meddling?  That is bad, and worse?  A waste of money and lives.  No one argues that anymore.  I used to be a Republican, no longer.  Being a Republican right now means allowing your friends, neighbors, and family to have no health coverage.  Everyone deserves access to health care.  And while this bill might not go far enough in fixing our health care system it is 100% a step forward.  The Republican plan (if it even exists) is to do nothing, and that is unconscionable.

White House and Health Reform 3/18/2010

H.R. 4872, THE HEALTH CARE & EDUCATION AFFORDABILITY RECONCILIATION ACT of 2010 SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Title I – Coverage, Medicare, Medicaid and Revenues

Subtitle A – Coverage

Sec. 1001. Affordability. Improves the financing for premiums and cost sharing for individuals with incomes up to 400% of the federal poverty level. Subsection (a) improves tax credits to make premiums more affordable as a percent of income; and subsection (b) improves support for cost sharing, focusing on those with incomes below 250% of the federal poverty level. Starting in 2019, constrains the growth in tax credits if premiums are growing faster than the consumer price index, unless spending is more than 10% below current CBO projections.

Sec. 1002. Individual responsibility. Modifies the assessment that individuals who choose to remain uninsured pay in three ways: (a) exempts the income below the filing threshold, (b) lowers the flat payment from $495 to $325 in 2015 and from $750 to $695 in 2016 and (c) raises the percent of income that is an alternative payment amount from

0.5 to 1.0% in 2014, 1.0 to 2.0% in 2015, and 2.0 to 2.5% for 2016 and subsequent years to make the assessment more progressive.

Sec. 1003. Employer responsibility. Improves the transition to the employer responsibility policy for employers with 50 or more full-time equivalent workers (FTE) by subtracting the first 30 full time employees from the payment calculation (e.g., a firm with 51 workers that does not offer coverage will pay an amount equal to 51 minus 30, or 21 times the applicable per employee payment amount). The provision also changes the applicable payment amount for firms with more than 50 FTEs that do not offer coverage to $2,000 per full-time employee. It also eliminates the assessment for workers in a waiting period, while maintaining the 90-day limit on the length of any waiting period beginning in 2014.

Sec. 1004. Income definitions. Modifies the definition of income that is used for purposes of subsidy eligibility and the individual responsibility requirement. The modifications conform the income definition to information that is currently reported on the Form 1040 and to the present law income tax return filing thresholds. The provision also extends the exclusion from gross income for employer provided health coverage for adult children up to age 26.

Sec. 1005. Implementation funding. Provides $1 billion to the Secretary of Health and Human Services to finance the administrative costs of implementing health insurance reform.

Subtitle B – Medicare

Sec. 1101. Closing the Medicare prescription drug “donut hole”. Provides a $250 rebate for all Medicare Part D enrollees who enter the donut hole in 2010. Builds on pharmaceutical manufacturers’ 50% discount on brand-name drugs beginning in 2011 to completely close the donut hole with 75% discounts on brand-name and generic drugs by 2020.

Sec. 1102. Medicare Advantage payments. Freezes Medicare Advantage payments in 2011. Beginning in 2012, the provision reduces Medicare Advantage benchmarks relative to current levels. Benchmarks will vary from 95% of Medicare spending in high-cost areas to 115% of Medicare spending in low-cost areas. The changes will be phased-in over 3, 5 or 7 years, depending on the level of payment reductions. The provision creates an incentive system to increase payments to high quality plans by at least 5%. It also extends CMS authority to adjust risk scores in Medicare Advantage for observed differences in coding patterns relative to fee-for service.

Sec. 1103. Savings from limits on MA plan administrative costs. Ensures Medicare Advantage plans spend at least 85% of revenue on medical costs or activities that improve quality of care, rather than profit and overhead.

Sec. 1104. Disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments. Advances Medicare disproportionate share hospital cuts to begin in fiscal year 2014 but lowers the ten-year reduction by $3 billion.

Sec. 1105. Market basket updates. Revises the hospital market basket reduction that is in addition to the productivity adjustment as follows: -0.3 in FY14 and -0.75 in FY17, FY18 and FY19. Removes Senate provision that eliminates the additional market basket for hospitals based on coverage levels. Providers affected are inpatient hospitals, long-term care hospitals, inpatient rehabilitation facilities, psychiatric hospitals and outpatient hospitals.

Sec. 1106. Physician ownership-referral. Changes to December 31, 2010 the date after which physician ownership of hospitals to which they self refer is prohibited and provides a limited exception to the growth restrictions for grandfathered physician owned hospitals that treat the highest percentage of Medicaid patients in their county (and are not the sole hospital in a county).

Sec. 1107. Payment for Imaging Services. Sets the assumed utilization rate at 75 percent for the practice expense portion of advanced diagnostic imaging services.

Subtitle C – Medicaid

Sec. 1201. Federal funding for States. Strikes the provision for a permanent 100% federal matching rate for Nebraska for the Medicaid costs of newly eligible individuals. Provides federal Medicaid matching payments for the costs of services to newly eligible individuals at the following rates in all states except expansion states: 100% in 2014, 2015, and 2016; 95% in 2017; 94% in 2018; 93% in 2019; and 90% thereafter. In the case of expansion states, reduces the state share of the costs of covering nonpregnant childless adults by 50% in 2014, 60% in 2015, 70% in 2016, 80% in 2017, 90% in 2018. In 2019 and thereafter, expansion states would bear the same state share of the costs of covering nonpregnant childless adults as non-expansion states (e.g., 7% in 2019, 10% thereafter).

Sec. 1202. Payments to primary care physicians. Requires that Medicaid payment rates to primary care physicians for furnishing primary care services be no less than 100% of Medicare payment rates in 2013 and 2014 (the first year of the Senate bill’s Medicaid coverage expansion to all individuals with incomes under 133% of poverty). Provides 100% federal funding for the incremental costs to States of meeting this requirement.

Sec. 1203. Disproportionate share hospital payments. Lowers the reduction in federal Medicaid DSH payments from $18.1 billion to $14.1 billion and advances the reductions to begin in fiscal year 2014. Directs the Secretary to develop a methodology for reducing federal DSH allotments to all states in order to achieve the mandated reductions. Extends through FY 2013 the federal DSH allotment for a state that has a $0 allotment after FY 2011.

Sec. 1204. Funding for the territories. Increases federal funding in the Senate bill for Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Northern Marianas Islands by $2 billion. Raises the caps on federal Medicaid funding for each of the territories.

Allows each territory to elect to operate a Health Benefits Exchange.

Sec. 1205. Delay in Community First Choice Option. Postpones from October 1, 2010 until October 1, 2011 the effective date of the option established for State Medicaid programs to cover attendant care services and supports for individuals who require an institutional level of care

Sec. 1206. Drug rebates for new formulations of existing drugs. For purposes of applying the additional rebate, narrows the definition of a new formulation of a drug to a line extension of a single source or innovator multiple source drug that is an oral solid dosage form of the drug.

Subtitle D – Reducing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse

Sec. 1301. Community Mental Health Centers. Establishes new requirements for community mental health centers that provide Medicare partial hospitalization services in order to prevent fraud and abuse.

Sec. 1302. Medicare prepayment medical review limitations. Streamlines procedures to conduct Medicare prepayment reviews to facilitate additional reviews designed to reduce fraud and abuse.

Sec. 1303. CMS-IRS data match to identify fraudulent providers. Allows the Secretary of Treasury to share IRS data with HHS employees to help screen and identify fraudulent providers or providers with tax debts, and to help recover such debts. Provides strict controls on the use of such information to protect taxpayer privacy.

Sec. 1304. Funding to fight fraud, waste and abuse. Increases funding for the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Fund by $250 million over the next decade. Indexes funds to fight Medicaid fraud based on the increase in the Consumer Price Index.

Sec. 1305. 90-day period of enhanced oversight for initial claims of DME suppliers.

Requires a 90-day period to withhold payment and conduct enhanced oversight in cases where the HHS Secretary identifies a significant risk of fraud among DME suppliers.

Subtitle E – Revenues

Sec. 1401. High-cost plan excise tax. Reduces the revenue collected by the tax by 80 percent. This is achieved by: delaying the application of the tax until 2018, which gives the plans time to implement and realize the cost savings of reform; increasing the dollar thresholds to $10,200 for single coverage and $27,500 for family coverage ($11,850 and $30,950 for retirees and employees in high risk professions); excluding stand-alone dental and vision plans from the tax; and permitting an employer to reduce the cost of the coverage when applying the tax if the employer’s age and gender demographics are not representative of the age and gender demographics of a national risk pool. Under the modified provision, the dollar thresholds are indexed to inflation and the dollar thresholds are automatically increased in 2018 if CBO is wrong in its forecast of the premium inflation rate between now and 2018.

Sec. 1402. Medicare tax. Modifies the tax to include net investment income in the taxable base. Currently, the Medicare tax does not apply to net investment income. The Medicare tax on net investment income does not apply if modified adjusted gross income is less than $250,000 in the case of a joint return, or $200,000 in the case of a single return. Net investment income is interest, dividends, royalties, rents, gross income from a trade or business involving passive activities, and net gain from disposition of property (other than property held in a trade or business). Net investment income is reduced by properly allocable deductions to such income.

Sec. 1403. Delay of the annual limitation on contributions to a health FSA. Delays the provision by two years until 2013.

Sec. 1404. Brand name pharmaceuticals. Delays the industry fee on sales of brand name pharmaceuticals for use in government health programs by one year to 2011, and increases revenue raised by the fee by $4.8 billion.

Sec. 1405. Excise tax on medical device manufacturers. Delays the tax by two years to 2013 and converts the industry fee to an excise tax on the first sale for use of medical devices at a rate of 2.9 percent. Exempts from the tax Class I medical devices, eyeglasses, contact lenses, hearing aids, and any device of a type that is generally purchased by the public at retail for individual use.

Sec. 1406. Health insurance providers. Delays the industry fee by 3 years to 2014 and modifies the annual industry fee for revenue neutrality. In the case of tax-exempt insurance providers, provides that only 50 percent of their net premiums that relate to their tax-exempt status are taken into account in calculating the fee. Provides exemptions for voluntary employee benefit associations (VEBAs) and nonprofit providers more than 80 percent of whose revenues is received from Social Security Act programs that target low income, elderly, or disabled populations.

Sec. 1407. Delay of elimination of deduction for expenses allocable to Medicare part D subsidy. Delays the provision by two years to 2013.

Sec. 1408. Elimination of unintended application of cellulosic biofuel producer credit. Adds an additional revenue provision. In 2008, Congress enacted a $1.01 per gallon tax credit for the production of biofuel from cellulosic feedstocks in order to encourage the development of new production capacity for biofuels that are not derived from food source materials. Congress is aware that some taxpayers are seeking to claim the cellulosic biofuel tax credit for unprocessed fuels, such as black liquor. The provision would limit eligibility for the tax credit to processed fuels (i.e., fuels that could be used in a car engine or in a home heating application).

Sec. 1409. Codification of economic substance doctrine and penalties. Adds an additional revenue provision. The economic substance doctrine is a judicial doctrine that has been used by the courts to deny tax benefits when the transaction generating these tax benefits lacks economic substance. The courts have not applied the economic substance doctrine uniformly. The provision would clarify the manner in which the economic substance doctrine should be applied by the courts and would impose a penalty on understatements attributable to a transaction lacking economic substance.

Sec. 1410. Time for payment of corporate estimated taxes. Provides for a one-time adjustment to corporate estimated taxes for payments made during calendar year 2014.

Sec. 1411. No impact on Social Security trust funds. Provides that Title II of the Social Security Act (the old age, survivor, and disability benefits program (OASDI)) is not amended or modified by the bill.

Subtitle F – Other Provisions

Sec. 1501. TAA for communities. Appropriates $500 Million a year for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 in the Community College and Career Training Grant program for community colleges to develop and improve educational or career training programs. Ensures that each state receives at least 0.5 percent of the total funds appropriated.

Title II – Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions

Subtitle A – Education

Section 2001. Short Title; References. Provides that this subtitle may be cited as the “SAFRA Act,” and that, except as otherwise provided, whenever an amendment to, or repeal of, a section or other provision, the reference shall be considered to be made to a section or other provision of the Higher Education Act of 1965.

Part I—Investing in Students and Families

Section 2101. Federal Pell Grants. Amends the Higher Education Act to include mandatory funding for the Pell Grant. This provides additional mandatory funding to augment funds appropriated to increase the federal maximum Pell Grant award by the change in the Consumer Price Index. The mandatory component of the funding is determined by inflating the previous year’s total and subtracting the maximum award provided for in the appropriations act for the previous year or $4860, whichever is greater. Beginning in the 2018-2019 academic year, the maximum Pell award will be at the 2017-2018 level.

Section 2102. Student Financial Assistance. This section provides $13.5 billion in mandatory appropriations to the Federal Pell Grant program.

Section 2103. College Access Challenge Grant Program. This section amends section 786 of the Higher Education Act by authorizing and appropriating $150 million for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 for the College Access Challenge Grant program created under the College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007. Provides that the allotment for each State under this section for a fiscal year shall not be an amount that is less than 1.0 percent of the total amount appropriated for a fiscal year.

Section 2104. Investment in Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Minority Serving Institutions. This section amends section 371(b) of the Higher Education Act by extending funding for programs under this section created under the College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007 for programs at Historically Black Colleges and Universities and minority-serving institutions through 2019, including programs that help low-income students attain degrees in the fields of science, technology, engineering or mathematics by the following annual amounts: $100 million to Hispanic Serving Institutions, $85 million to Historically Black Colleges and Universities, $15 million to Predominantly Black Institutions, $30 million to Tribal Colleges and Universities, $15 million to Alaska, Hawaiian Native Institutions, $5 million to Asian American and Pacific Islander Institutions, and $5 million to Native American non-tribal serving institutions.

Part II—Student Loan Reform

Section 2201. Termination of Federal Family Education Loan Appropriations. This section terminates the authority to make or insure any additional loans in the Federal Family Education Loan program after June 30, 2010.

Section 2202. Termination of Federal loan Insurance Program. This section is a conforming amendment with regard to the termination of the FFEL program, limiting Federal insurance to those loans in the Federal Family Education Loan program for loans first disbursed prior to July 1, 2010.

Section 2203. Termination of Applicable Interest Rates. This section makes a conforming amendment with regard to the termination of the FFEL program limiting interest rate applicability to Stafford, Consolidation, and PLUS loans to those loans made before July 1, 2010.

Section 2204. Termination of Federal payments to Reduce Student Interest Costs.

This section makes a conforming amendment with regard to the termination of the FFEL program by limiting subsidy payments to lenders for those loans for which the first disbursement is made before July 1, 2010.

Section 2205. Termination of FFEL PLUS Loans. This section makes a conforming change with regard to the termination of the FFEL program for federal PLUS loans by prohibiting further FFEL origination of loans after July 1, 2010.

Section 2206. Federal Consolidation Loans. This section makes conforming changes with regard to the termination of the FFEL program for federal consolidation loans. This section also provides that, for a 1 year period, borrowers who have loans under both the Direct Lending program and the FFEL program, or who have loans under either program as well as loans that have been sold to the Secretary, may consolidate such loans under the Direct Lending program regardless of whether such borrowers have entered repayment on such loans.

Section 2207. Termination of Unsubsidized Stafford loans for Middle-Income Borrowers. This section makes conforming changes with regard to the termination of the FFEL program for Unsubsidized Stafford loans by prohibiting further FFEL origination of loans after July 1, 2010.

Section 2208. Termination of Special Allowances. This section makes conforming changes with regard to the termination of the FFEL program by limiting special allowance payments to lenders under the FFEL program to loans first disbursed before July 1, 2010.

Section 2209. Origination of Direct Loans at Institutions Outside the United States.

This section provides for the origination of federal Direct Loans at institutions located outside of the United States, through a financial institution designated by the Secretary.

Section 2210. Conforming amendments. This section makes conforming technical changes with regard to the termination of the FFEL program for Department of Education agreements with Direct Lending institutions.

Section 2211. Terms and Conditions of Loans. This section makes conforming technical changes with regard to the termination of the FFEL program to clarify the terms and conditions of Direct Loans.

Section 2212. Contracts. This section directs the Secretary to award contracts for servicing federal Direct Loans to eligible non-profit servicers. In addition, this section provides that for the first 100,000 borrower loan accounts, the Secretary shall establish a separate pricing tier. Specifies that the Secretary is to allocate the loan accounts of 100,000 borrowers to each eligible non-profit servicer. The section also permits the Secretary to reallocate, increase, reduce or terminate an eligible non-profit servicer’s allocation based on the performance of such servicer. In addition, this section appropriates mandatory funds to the Secretary to be obligated for administrative costs of servicing contracts with eligible non-profit servicers. This section also requires the Secretary to provide technical assistance to institutions of higher education participating or seeking to participate in the Direct Lending program. This section appropriates $50 million for fiscal year 2010 to pay for this technical assistance. Additionally, this section authorizes the Secretary to provide payments to loan servicers for retaining jobs at location in the United States where such servicers were operating on January 1, 2010. This section appropriates $25,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2010 and 2011 for such purpose.

Section 2213. Agreements with State-Owned Banks. This section amends Part D of Title IV to direct the Secretary to enter into an agreement with an eligible lender for the purpose of providing Federal loan insurance on student loans made by state-owned banks.

Section 2214. Income-Based Repayment. The section amends the Income-Based Repayment program to cap student loan payments for new borrowers after July 1, 2014 to 10% of adjusted income, from 15% percent, and to forgive remaining balances after 20 years of repayment, from 25 years.

Subtitle B – Health

Sec. 2301. Insurance Reforms. Extends the prohibition of lifetime limits, prohibition on rescissions, limitations on excessive waiting periods, and a requirement to provide coverage for non-dependent children up to age 26 to all existing health insurance plans starting six months after enactment. For group health plans, prohibits pre-existing condition exclusions in 2014, restricts annual limits beginning six months after enactment, and prohibits them starting in 2014. For coverage of non-dependent children prior to 2014, the requirement on group health plans is limited to those adult children without an employer offer of coverage.

Sec. 2302. Drugs Purchased by Covered Entities. Repeals the underlying 340B expansion to inpatient drugs and exemptions to GPO exclusion. Exempts orphan drugs from required discounts for new 340B entities.

Sec. 2303. Community Health Centers. Increases mandatory funding for community health centers to $11 billion over five years (FY 2011 – FY 2015).

Prepared by Committees on Ways & Means, Energy & Commerce, and Education & Labor, March 18, 2010

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Keep The Public Option Alive

I received an email today from the great website http://democracyforamerica.com, which is seeking to not save health reform, though this is a great idea, but to save the public option.  Health reform without a public option will make the health insurance companies rich but do nothing to control rising health care costs.

I am asking you to donate money if you support health reform to this great organization.  Perhaps you need to read how much money the health care industry has dumped into defeating the bill.

Support the Public Option

After Senator Durbin announced that Senate Leadership would get the votes needed to pass any reconciliation bill sent to the Senate from the House — even if it included a public option — Speaker Nancy Pelosi and other House Democrats spent all weekend still claiming that the Senate doesn’t have the votes.

The Senate has 51 votes for a public option and we can prove it.

Today, we’re releasing this new ad pressuring Speaker Pelosi and others in Congress to put a public option in the new House bill. They need to see this ad right away so they don’t kill the public option by mistake.

PLEASE CONTRIBUTE $20 RIGHT NOW TO KEEP THIS AD ON THE AIR

The House may vote this week on health care — so we need to act fast.

If Speaker Pelosi puts a public option in the bill, the over two million members of Democracy for America, Progressive Change Campaign Committee, and CREDO Action will help lock down the 216 votes needed to pass healthcare reform in the House.

That’s why we’re running this ad at least 100 times in D.C. before Wednesday. The more we raise to air it, the more members of Congress will see it on MSNBC and CNN before it’s too late.

CLICK HERE TO VIEW THE AD

This is the end game. We can win this if Democrats in Washington have the will to lead.

Working together, we’re helping deliver the votes they need to pass real reform. Thank you for everything you do.

-Jim

Jim Dean, Chair
Democracy for America

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Americans Angry, Burn Down Village!

Everyday, Democrats are becoming more and more desperate to reform our health care system, while Republicans look for ways to foil them.  Most Americans are sadly ignorant of this health reform fiasco, but they should be very much angry at this point.  Like when the angry mob goes after Frankenstein, Americans should go to Washington and demand answers.  Health Reform, were it even to pass, will at best most likely be watered down vodka, you feel good that you have it at least, but when you drink it, your problems don’t go away.

So this article is to awaken you America, to this growing health care crises, so that you will spring into action, like an angry superhero.  Here is the sad truth….

The number of uninsured Americans could grow by 10 million people in just five years, and spending on government health care programs for the poor could more than double by 2020, if there are not significant reforms to the current health care system, according to a new analysis just released from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF).
Urban Institute researchers used their Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model to assess the changes in coverage patterns and health care costs that will occur nationally from 2010 to 2020 if major reforms are not enacted. The authors provide a range of scenarios to assess the effects. In the worst case:
• By 2015, there could be 59.7 million people uninsured. The number could swell to 67.6 million by 2020. An estimated 49.4 million individuals were uninsured in 2010.
• Middle-class households would suffer most without reform, with the percentage of these families without health coverage rising from 19 percent today to 28 percent at decade’s end.
• As premiums nearly double, employees in small firms would see offers of health insurance almost cut in half, dropping from 41 percent of firms offering insurance in 2010 to 23 percent in 2020.
• For employers who continued to offer health insurance, more of the costs would likely be passed on to workers. At the same time, individuals and families would face higher out-of-pocket costs for premiums and health care services. Their spending will jump 34 percent by 2015 and 79 percent by 2020.

The study from the Urban Institute also examined three alternative scenarios:

1. Worst case – continuing high levels of unemployment; slow growth in incomes; high growth rates for health care costs;
2. Intermediate case – somewhat faster growth in incomes, but a lower growth rate for health care costs; and
3. Best case – full employment; faster income growth; even slower growth in health care costs.

Under all three economic scenarios, the analysis finds that middle-class families will be hardest hit, as by 2020, they will compose over half of the uninsured population in America. Specifically, the researchers explored the following question on the effects that failure to reform the health care system would have on the composition of uninsured:

What will the composition of the uninsured look like in ten years compared to now if health reform fails in terms of income, age and health status?

• Middle-income families will be hardest hit. In the worst case, the uninsured rate for those in families with incomes from 200 to 399 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) would rise by 9 percentage points, from 19 percent to 28 percent in 2020. The number of uninsured people in this income group would increase by 7.3 million people. In the best case, the uninsured rate would rise to 23 percent. The rate of uninsurance for families with incomes 400 percent of the FPL or more would also increase. The number of uninsured families in this income level would increase from 7 percent in 2010 to 13 percent in the worst case, and 9 percent in the best case in 2020.
• A larger share of the uninsured would come from middle- and higher-income families. In the worst case, more than half of the uninsured will have incomes of more than 200 percent of the FPL in 2020, whereas such families currently comprise an estimated 44 percent of the uninsured. Even in the best case, the uninsured will increasingly consist of middle- and higher-income Americans. Being mostly ineligible for Medicaid or the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), middle- and higher-income families who lose private coverage would become uninsured, whereas many eligible lower-income individuals would obtain coverage through Medicaid or CHIP.
• The rate of uninsurance among lower-income families will remain at high levels. In the best and worst cases, those in families with incomes less than 200 percent of the FPL will continue to have high uninsurance rates of 33 to 34 percent. Uninsurance rates would remain stable as eligible individuals increasingly shift to public coverage. This assumes that states maintain Medicaid eligibility at current levels.
• The uninsured rate would increase significantly for older adults. For adults ages 45 to 54, the rate would increase from 17 percent in 2010 to 24 percent in 2020 in the worst case. For adults ages 55 to 64, the uninsured rate would increase from 15 percent in 2010 to 18 percent in the best case, and 22 percent in the worst case in 2020. While the value of health insurance increases as people get older, many over age 45 would lose access to coverage through their employers while nongroup premiums would become increasingly unaffordable. For children ages 18 and below, Medicaid and CHIP would limit the rise in uninsurance rates to a 3 percentage point increase in ten years in the worst case.

The Changing Ranks of the Uninsured

• The uninsured population will shift somewhat toward older age groups. Young adults ages 19 to 24 would have the highest rate of uninsurance in each year and scenario. They will, however, become a smaller share of the uninsured population in 2020 in both the best and worst cases. The share of uninsured ages 35 to 64 will be higher in 2020 in the worst case, with only minor changes in the best case.
• Uninsured rates will rise for those in better health. Among people in excellent, very good or good health, the uninsured rate would rise from 18 percent in 2010 to 20 percent in the best case, and 24 percent in the worst case. Currently, those in fair or poor health are more likely to be uninsured than those in better health. Among people in fair or poor health, the uninsured rate would remain fairly stable over time at 22 percent. This is because those with higher health care needs who currently have coverage would be more likely to continue their coverage as premiums increase. As a result, those who continue to have private health insurance will be an increasingly less healthy population in 2020.

Impact On Medicaid and CHIP (Childrens Health Insurance Program)

1. Worst case – continuing high levels of unemployment; slow growth in incomes; high growth rates for health care costs;
2. Intermediate case – somewhat faster growth in incomes, but a lower growth rate for health care costs; and
3. Best case – full employment; faster income growth; even slower growth in health care costs.

Under all three economic scenarios, the analysis finds that an increasing burden would be placed upon existing public insurance programs like Medicaid and CHIP. Specifically, the researchers explored the following questions on the effects that failure to reform the health care system would have on Medicaid and other public insurance programs:

How many people will obtain coverage under Medicaid given changes in incomes, health care costs and declines in employer coverage?

• Medicaid and CHIP coverage would increase substantially. Enrollment in the programs would increase from 45.4 million in 2010 to 58.2 million in 2020 in the worst case scenario, an increase of 12.8 million nonelderly Americans covered under public programs. Even in the best case, enrollment would increase by 7.2 million persons.

How much will spending on public insurance (e.g. Medicaid and CHIP) increase?

• Medicaid and CHIP expenditures on acute care services for the nonelderly would grow considerably. The increase would happen both because of increased enrollment and because of higher health care costs. In the worst case scenario Medicaid and CHIP spending for the nonelderly would increase from $278 billion in 2010 to $576 billion in 2020, an increase of 108 percent. In the best case, spending would increase by 59 percent to $442 billion. This assumes states maintain current eligibility levels. If they do not, Medicaid enrollment and spending will be lower but uncompensated care costs will be higher.

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Health Insurance Exchanges and Health Reform

A new study from the Robert Wood Foundation that hypothesizes the role of health insurance exchanges after health reform.

Introduction

While the health reform debate continues in Washington, both the House and the Senate proposals include the establishment of health insurance exchanges to help facilitate the purchase of insurance for individuals and small employers. Although the bills differ in terms of the structure and number of exchanges— particularly whether to establish a single, national exchange or to support the creation of state and regional exchanges, as well as the larger policy issue regarding the creation of a public health insurance option to compete against commercial insurers—both proposals feature an insurance exchange as a central element of health reform.

Supporters of the exchange model view it as a way to organize the market, provide individuals and small employers with a central source of information, enable the comparability of benefit designs, administer public subsidies, facilitate the purchase of insurance through standardized enrollment processes, and improve competition among carriers. At its very core, an insurance exchange seeks to alter competition in the health insurance market from one based on avoiding risk to one based on price and quality.1

The success of Massachusetts’s health reform law in covering upwards of 95 percent of all residents has convinced many people that an exchange, or in the parlance of Massachusetts, a “connector,” is critical to expanding health coverage. However, whether—and how—an exchange can be instituted will vary from place to place, and its value will depend on the structure and role of the proposed exchange.

State-based exchanges, as opposed to a single national exchange, are the focus of this brief.  Proponents of a national exchange argue that it would be better able to exercise bargaining power to reduce premiums and lower administrative costs.  However, the establishment of a national exchange would likely require standardization of insurance rules across the states, which would bring with it a host of additional policy decisions, as well as various implementation and operational issues.

This Issue Brief provides readers with an overview of the potential role of a health insurance exchange, state-specific issues that should be considered before establishing an exchange, and the different ways in which an exchange might be structured and operated.  Regardless of the outcome of national health reform, a number of states are contemplating creating a health insurance exchange as a way to improve the individual and small group markets.

In addition, this brief makes no assumptions regarding potential changes to individual and small group health insurance rules and regulations (e.g., guaranteed issue requirement, elimination of medical underwriting, no pre-existing condition exclusions or waiting periods, restrictions on allowable rating factors, limitations on rate bands, etc.).  Nor does it assume either an individual mandate to purchase health insurance or an employer play-or-pay requirement regarding the offering of employer-sponsored insurance, both of which are major elements of the national health reform proposals.

Certainly, changes to the insurance rules could have a material effect on the availability and affordability of health insurance. An individual mandate and/ or an employer play-or-pay requirement would alter the health insurance markets across all of the commercial segments (i.e., individual, small group and large group).  However, these changes would impact states in different ways depending on each state’s current insurance rules and regulations, the level of health coverage and rate of uninsured, and the extent to which employers are offering employer-sponsored insurance.

Nevertheless, the issues associated with establishing a health insurance exchange, and the groundwork that states can take in preparation for the possible development of an exchange, can be undertaken without regard to these or other changes that may occur as a result of federal health reform.

Developing a Baseline

The first step state policymakers should take in deciding whether to create an exchange is developing a thorough understanding of the existing sources of coverage, documenting the ways in which health insurance is obtained—for publicly-subsidized programs as well as commercial health insurance—and clearly delineating the problems or issues that an exchange is intended to address.  By assembling a strong foundation of knowledge, policymakers can then decide whether, and how best, to structure an exchange that meets the needs of state residents and extends health coverage to the uninsured in the most efficient manner.

A comprehensive understanding of the state’s current health insurance markets should include not only a thorough examination of the uninsured, but also an examination of the currently insured, recognizing that people move in and out of health coverage—as well as across different types of coverage (i.e., public and private)—throughout the year.
The analysis of the uninsured should include:

  • Estimates of the total number of people who lack health coverage;
  • Demographic information (i.e., age, gender, marital status, race/ethnicity), as well as any geographic/regional variations in the distribution of the uninsured;
  • Family income;
  • Employment, including a breakdown of the uninsured who are employed based on the size of their employer (i.e., number of employees), and whether they are offered employer-sponsored insurance; and
  • Eligibility for publicly-subsidized health coverage programs.

This information is important and useful for a number of reasons, not least of which is the value in helping to quantify the number of people who do not have access to health coverage, determining how effectively current public programs are reaching the intended target populations, and developing projections of the potential cost of expanding publicly-subsidized coverage.  Detailed information on the uninsured can be used to target outreach and enrollment efforts for existing health coverage programs, to design new health insurance products and programs, and to better understand the population that could be served by an exchange.

In Massachusetts, detailed information on the uninsured was used to develop the health reform law, to establish the specific provisions of the various health insurance programs, and throughout implementation to target outreach efforts to particular groups of residents.  The data used by Massachusetts policymakers included publicly available data (e.g., US Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey, Massachusetts Department of Health Care Finance and Policy), as well as data prepared by researchers funded through the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts Foundation’s “Roadmap to Coverage” initiative.

The Massachusetts data showed that a disproportionate percentage of young adults lacked health insurance and these data were subsequently used to persuade lawmakers to enact a legislative change that allowed commercial carriers to develop lower-cost “Young Adult Plans.”  These plans were allowed to offer slightly slimmer benefits than standard commercial insurance and were made available to individuals ages 18 to 26 who did not have access to subsidized coverage, either through an employer or through public programs.

The data were also used by the Connector to inform its marketing strategy, in particular the Connector’s decision to partner with the Boston Red Sox as a way to reach men and young adults, two groups with higher than average rates of uninsurance.  In addition, the data were used to estimate enrollment for the various publicly-subsidized health insurance programs, including programs that were in effect prior to health reform as well as the newly-established health insurance programs.

A second phase of the analysis should include a thorough review of the existing publicly-subsidized health insurance programs, including the penetration (i.e., take-up rates) of the different programs, the distribution methods (i.e., outreach and enrollment) for each program, and a review of how existing programs may complement an exchange model.  In particular, states should carefully review public programs that provide premium subsidies for lower-income individuals who work for small employers; programs that are designed to assist people who are recently unemployed (e.g., COBRA premium subsidy programs); and other programs geared toward helping working adults obtain coverage.

A number of states have established premium subsidy programs for lower-income individuals who work for small employers (e.g., Maryland’s Health Insurance Partnership, Insure Oklahoma, and Massachusetts’ Insurance Partnership).  These programs subsidize the employee’s share, and some programs also help subsidize the employer’s share, of the premium for employer-sponsored insurance.  It is important to understand how these programs might be impacted by the establishment of an exchange, particularly if the exchange provides premium subsidies to help lower-income individuals purchase insurance.

Not only will it be important to understand the eligibility rules for the various public programs, but it will also be critical to recognize how premium subsidies for similarly-situated individuals might compare across these programs. For example, programs that subsidize employer-sponsored insurance offered by small employers will need to be matched against an exchange-based program that provides subsidies for the purchase of individual insurance, as these programs would likely be targeted toward many of the same people.  States will need to understand how the programs interact and structure the programs so that they are complementary.  There may also be opportunities to consolidate or eliminate programs, as well as opportunities to streamline program administration.

The final step of the baseline analysis should include a thorough review of the commercially insured, in much the same way that the detailed examination of the uninsured was undertaken.  For many states, detailed information on the insured population may not be as readily available as information on the uninsured.  For some of the metrics noted below, it may be necessary to piece together information from a variety of sources (e.g., state insurance agencies, commercial health plans, private researchers), or states may need to sponsor new research to obtain this information.

The review of the insured population should include the following:

  • Demographic profile of the insured across each of the major market segments (i.e., individual, small group, large group);
  • Geographic/regional variations in the coverage rate of the commercially insured;
  • Number of carriers operating in the market;
  • Breakdown by size of employers that offer insurance;
  • Types of insurance provided by employers (i.e., benefit design, cost-sharing arrangements);
  • Premiums and the percentage paid by employees and employers;
  • Employees’ take-up rate of employer-sponsored insurance by size of employer; and
  • Manner by which individuals obtain coverage (e.g., directly from carriers, through a broker, using an intermediary, etc.).

Particular attention should be paid to the individual and small group markets. Policymakers will need to consider a number of issues in these market segments, including the rating rules and regulations; the extent to which these markets are functioning, what is working well, and what is not; the existence, operation and membership of high-risk pools; the number of carriers and types of health plans available; the manner by which commercial insurance is distributed (e.g., the role of insurance brokers, intermediaries, carriers, third-party administrators, etc.); and the sources and types of information available to individual and small group purchasers.

This information will be crucial in determining whether, how, and to what extent, an exchange might improve access to health insurance.  For example, in many parts of the country there is little competition among health carriers.  In these markets, what would be the role of an exchange?  Are there barriers to entry that could be lowered or eliminated by the establishment of an exchange?  Is it necessary to establish an exchange or can the market be improved through other means to encourage more competition among insurers?

In other states, commercial exchange-like entities may already be operating.  In these markets, private-sector intermediaries may provide small groups and, in some instances, individual consumers with a central point of access to compare health benefits and select a health plan from among a number of insurers.

For example, the Connecticut Business and Industry Association operates the Health Connections program, which enables small employers (i.e., firms with 3 to 100 employees) to offer their employees a number of health plans and health insurers from which to choose.  In Maryland, several third party administrators provide individuals and small employers with a central point of access to select from numerous health plans offered by a range of health carriers.

Policymakers also need to determine what is currently available in the market.  In states with already functioning private sector exchange-like entities, policymakers will want to consider whether there are opportunities to leverage the infrastructure and capabilities of existing intermediaries to improve the functioning of the individual and small group markets.

Finally, a recognition and understanding of the role of health insurance brokers is essential.  In most states, brokers play a central role in the purchase of health insurance, and their influence in the market should not be underestimated. However, brokers’ involvement may vary from state to state, and their role may differ between the individual and small group markets.

For example, prior to health reform in Massachusetts, brokers played no role in the purchase of health insurance by individuals, but they were heavily involved in the purchase of health insurance by small employers. Understanding the role played by health insurance brokers—and how they may support an evolving individual and small group market—could prove crucial to the success of an exchange.

Key Issues for an Exchange

Having established a strong baseline of information and an understanding of how the state’s health insurance market operates, policymakers will need to weigh various policy options in determining how an exchange might be structured to achieve the objective of extending health coverage to more residents; and how an exchange can help transform the individual and small group markets from competition based on avoiding risk into competition based on price and quality.

Defining the exchange’s roles and responsibilities is essential to determining what type of administrative structure is most appropriate. While an exchange can take many different forms, there are three basic models to consider:

  1. market organizer and distribution channel;
  2. selective contracting agent; and
  3. active purchaser.

Market organizer and distribution channel: under this model, the exchange acts as an impartial source of information on health plans that are available in the market; provides structure to the market to enable consumers to compare health plans and purchase coverage; and serves as a broker of health insurance by handling premium billing and collection, as well as other administrative responsibilities on behalf of consumers and health carriers. Although not yet fully developed, the Intermediaries — also known as third party administrators or general agents  — provide administrative services, including processing enrollment, premium billing and collection, mid-year changes in enrollment or rate basis type, COBRA administration, and other administrative services. Unlike health insurance brokers, intermediaries do not sell insurance, although many intermediaries also have a brokerage business that does.

In the individual and small group markets, intermediaries handle a number of admin­istrative functions that for large employers are usually handled by the health carrier or the employer’s human resources staff.  Intermediaries are typically paid by the health carrier through retention of a portion of the premium.

Utah Exchange (www.exchange.utah.gov) provides an example of this type of model.
Selective contracting agent: this model includes many of the same functions noted above, but also attempts to influence the market and enhance competition by contracting with a select group of carriers and offering a limited number of health plans.  The exchange solicits health plans based on plan design parameters established by the administrators of the exchange.  However, the exchange does not necessarily negotiate premiums with the health carriers, but provides an endorsement of the health plans that it chooses to offer.  The Massachusetts Connector (www.mahealthconnector.org) uses a selective contracting approach for its commercial offerings (i.e., Commonwealth Choice).

Active purchaser: an exchange might also play a more active role in the market by establishing plan designs and purchasing health insurance much like a large employer procures health benefits on behalf of its employees.  This model is predicated on the exchange covering a large group of members, comprised of a relatively healthy risk pool that enables insurers to offer competitively-priced plans.  Many of the health purchasing cooperatives that were established in the 1990s, such as California’s PacAdvantage (originally called the Health Insurance Plan of California) and the Texas Insurance Purchasing Alliance (TIPA), are examples of active purchaser models.

The approach taken—market organizer and distribution channel, selective contracting agent, or active purchaser— will dictate the administrative structure necessary to support the exchange. In particular, the more the exchange is actively involved in the market, the more likely the need to establish an entity with adequate staff to operate the exchange or to designate an existing agency to serve as the exchange administrator.

In addition to its impact on staffing levels, the exchange’s roles and responsibilities will influence its governance structure. An exchange that supports the existing market, has no regulatory responsibilities, and does not actively participate in the selection of health plans likely will not require a significant governing authority to oversee its activities.  However, if regulatory responsibilities are handed to the exchange, and if the exchange acts more like a purchaser of health plans, there may be greater demand for a more public governing body.

For example, the Massachusetts Connector Authority was given a number of regulatory responsibilities—e.g., establishing minimum creditable coverage standards for the individual mandate, approving the benefits and income-based premium schedules for subsidized health coverage, adopting an affordability schedule, and setting the penalties for not having health insurance.  This led the state legislature to establish a public governing board for the Connector Authority, comprised of ex-officio public officials and individuals appointed by the governor and attorney general.  In contrast, the Utah Exchange has no comparable regulatory authority, serves primarily as a market organizer and distribution channel, and is housed within the Governor’s Office of Economic Development.

Funding and Operating an Exchange

Even if the exchange is set up as a “simple” market organizer and distribution channel—as opposed to an active purchaser of health insurance—the services provided by the exchange may require an initial investment of resources as well as an ongoing stream of revenue to fund operations.  The level of upfront investment will depend, in part, on the types of services currently being provided in the market and the extent to which existing services may be leveraged and utilized by the exchange.
An exchange that is responsible for structuring the market, providing consumers with an ability to compare health plans, generating premium quotes, and enrolling individuals and/ or groups in coverage will require information technology infrastructure and customer service staff. Whether the infrastructure and personnel are built or bought—i.e., established and operated by the administrator of the exchange or outsourced to a third party—there will be significant back-office infrastructure needed to operate the exchange.

In addition to assisting consumers with initial health plan selection and enrollment responsibilities, a fully-functioning exchange will need to provide ongoing account management and maintenance (e.g., monthly premium billing and collection, processing changes in coverage status, delinquent payment notification, renewals, etc.).  The exchange administrator will need to establish—or work with an entity that has already established—electronic data interchanges with the health carriers in order to generate quotes, process enrollments, and handle myriad administrative responsibilities.

If the exchange is also responsible for administering public subsidies to help lower-income individuals purchase insurance, the exchange will need to establish an eligibility determination process or utilize an existing means of screening applicants for subsidized health coverage (e.g., the state’s Medicaid agency). The costs associated with determining eligibility for subsidized coverage—as well as handling eligibility redetermination processes and administering program integrity measures—may also need to be factored into the cost of operating the exchange.

The amount of capital needed to set up an exchange will depend on the availability and capabilities of existing commercial intermediaries, as well as the ability of public agencies to process eligibility applications for premium subsidies—and the extent to which these resources are leveraged.  Regardless, funding ongoing operations will require either an annual appropriation, retaining a portion of the premium for coverage obtained through the exchange, or possibly a combination of the two.

The Massachusetts Connector received an upfront appropriation of $25 million, with ongoing operations funded through retention of a portion of the premiums for subsidized and unsubsidized health coverage purchased through the Connector. In the private sector, intermediaries and health insurance brokers are typically paid through retention of a portion of the premiums paid by enrollees.  The fees retained by these administrative entities typically range from 3 to 5 percent of premiums.

Building or Renting Administrative Functions

In a number of states, private sector intermediaries provide administrative services on behalf of health insurers and consumers.  These entities typically operate in the individual and small group markets.  Often working in concert with health insurance brokers, the intermediaries generate premium quotes, process enrollments, bill, collect and remit premiums, and provide a range of post-enrollment administrative functions.  In essence, these intermediaries take over account management functions that are otherwise handled by a health carrier and/ or the benefits management office of mid-sized and large employers.

In those states with private intermediaries, public exchange administrators will need to decide whether, and how best, to leverage the capabilities of these businesses. There will likely be significant advantages to contracting with one or more existing intermediaries, not least of which are the infrastructure and the data interchanges that these companies have established with the health carriers.  This will be particularly relevant for exchanges that intend to offer a variety of health plans from a number of carriers.  It is worth noting that despite different approaches to the exchange model, the Massachusetts Connector and the Utah Exchange use private sector intermediaries to administer their commercial insurance offerings.

The exchange administrator may need to decide whether to contract with one intermediary or utilize the services of multiple intermediaries.  This decision will depend, in part, on the role of the exchange and the capabilities of the private intermediaries.  Massachusetts contracts with one intermediary for its commercial insurance offering and a separate intermediary for its subsidized insurance program; Utah offers a number of intermediaries from which small employers may purchase commercial insurance.

The decision of whether and how best to utilize the services of existing private sector intermediaries will be affected by the roles and responsibilities of the public exchange, as well as the capabilities of these businesses.  Exchange administrators will need to determine which services can be handled internally, which should be outsourced, and which intermediaries are best equipped to provide the administrative services required.

Premium Subsidies and the Role of the Exchange

The health reform proposals being considered by Congress empower the exchange with administering a premium subsidy program to help lower-income individuals purchase insurance.  How the subsidized insurance program is designed will affect the structure and operation of the exchange.  There are two basic options with regard to a premium subsidy program: establish a separate Medicaid-like health plan with enrollment limited to individuals eligible for subsidized coverage; or provide premium subsidies to help individuals purchase health coverage in the commercial market.

Massachusetts adopted the former model. The Connector’s subsidized health plan, Commonwealth Care, is available to adult residents of Massachusetts with incomes at or below 300 percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) who do not have access to other types of subsidized health coverage (e.g., Medicaid, Medicare, employer-sponsored insurance, etc.).3  This program is separate and distinct from commercial insurance offered through the Connector.

The Connector establishes the benefits schedules (i.e., services covered, point ­of-service cost sharing) and negotiates rates with the health carriers that choose to participate in the subsidized insurance plan.  Individuals eligible for subsidized coverage are then able to choose coverage from the participating carriers.  The services covered and the point-of-service cost sharing are the same for each plan type,4 although the monthly premium paid by the enrollee may vary depending on the rate negotiated between the health carrier and the Connector.  In addition to potential differences in monthly premiums, the major difference across the carriers is the provider network (i.e., which physicians and hospitals are included in the network).

The latter approach is the one that is most commonly discussed as part of national health reform.  Under this model, public funds would be made available to subsidize the premiums for lower-income individuals wishing to purchase health insurance in the commercial market.

One advantage of using public funds to subsidize premiums in the commercial market is that an individual would be able to maintain his or health plan when their income grows and they are no longer eligible for a subsidy.  In contrast, under the Massachusetts Connector’s Commonwealth Care program, once someone becomes ineligible for publicly-subsidized coverage they lose their health insurance and must purchase a new policy in the commercial market.

Nonetheless, an exchange that provides subsidies for commercial insurance will have a number of decisions to make in determining how best to structure the program.  For example, will the subsidy be available only for a select group of plans or for all commercial plans sold through the exchange? Will the subsidy be set as a fixed dollar amount based on the lowest cost plan available or will the subsidy be set as a percentage of the premium?  Will there be a pre-determined open enrollment period or will enrollment occur on a rolling basis? Policymakers will need to grapple with these and many other policy and administrative issues.

Outreach and Enrollment

Instituting an aggressive and pro-active outreach and enrollment campaign will be critical to generating sufficient enrollment in the health plans offered through the exchange, which in turn will largely determine the sustainability and success of the exchange.  This will be true for publicly-subsidized health coverage, as well as unsubsidized health insurance.

The fact that millions of Americans are eligible—but not enrolled—in (free) Medicaid coverage is an indication of the challenge that states will face in signing up people for coverage through the exchange, particularly for people who will be charged a monthly premium. While an individual mandate will certainly affect the take-up rate, policymakers must recognize that people will need information on the health insurance options available and their responsibility to obtain and maintain health coverage.
The Massachusetts experience is helpful in this regard. After health reform was enacted, the state undertook a multi-pronged outreach, education, and enrollment effort, utilizing state employees, community-based advocacy organizations, hospitals, community health centers, paid media, and public-service announcements, as well as pro bono private sector advertisements. As noted previously, a major part of the Connector’s marketing strategy included promotional activities and paid advertisements during Boston Red Sox games, in an effort to reach young adults and men, two groups that were disproportionately uninsured.  In addition, to jump-start enrollment in Commonwealth Care, tens of thousands of individuals who had been receiving care through the state’s free care pool were automatically enrolled in this new publicly-subsidized health coverage program.

However, even with a multi-million dollar outreach effort, Commonwealth Care enrollees who are charged a premium for health insurance are more likely to be older than enrollees who are provided free health insurance. As of November 2009—three years since the program’s inception—over 43 percent of Commonwealth Care enrollees in the highest income category (i.e., 200 percent to 300 percent FPL) are age 50 or older, compared to 26 percent of enrollees in the lowest income category (i.e., 150 percent FPL or less).  Conversely, only 11 percent of enrollees in the highest income category are 19–26 years old, while this age group comprised over one-third of enrollees in the lowest income category.

The importance of attracting a large and diverse risk pool, comprised of a broad mix of individuals with varying health care needs, will largely determine whether an exchange can effectively function and be sustainable.  The history—and the ultimate demise—of the insurance cooperatives and health purchasing alliances that sprang up in the early and mid-1990s provides ample evidence of the dangers of not attracting and retaining a large and diverse risk pool.5

While outreach and enrollment will be crucial for the success of the subsidized insurance program, the exchange will also need to attract a significant share of the unsubsidized individual and small group market.  In order for a commercial, non-subsidized health insurance exchange to survive, it will need to attract enough volume to create administrative efficiencies and be “risk neutral” in terms of the overall health status of the individuals and small groups purchasing coverage through the exchange.

The exchange, or an entity aligned with the exchange, will need to undertake both a broad public information campaign and a targeted marketing strategy to create awareness and generate customers.  This will require a significant, sustained, and multi-pronged approach.

The Risk of Adverse Selection

A well-organized and multi-faceted outreach and enrollment initiative will be necessary to inform individuals and to enroll a large and broad mix of people in the exchange.  The success of this effort will have ramifications for the sustainability of the program due to the impact that the health status of the population covered may have on the premiums of policies purchased through the exchange.

Publicly-subsidized insurance often faces little “competition,” in that most people eligible for public health insurance programs do not usually have alternative sources of coverage. And while people in good health may not sign up for publicly-subsidized coverage until they think they “need it,” even if it is free, commercial insurers face an even greater challenge attracting enough healthy people to offset and spread the cost of members with significant health care needs.  This is particularly true in the individual market.

Pro-active outreach and enrollment— along with an individual mandate—should help attract a large number of people to the subsidized insurance program available through the exchange.  However, the commercial (non-subsidized) health insurance made available through the exchange may be competing for customers against other established distribution channels (e.g., carriers, health insurance brokers, Web-based brokers, intermediaries).

If the exchange becomes the sole source of coverage for individual and small group purchasers—as some have suggested—and there are no alternative distribution channels, adverse selection becomes less of a concern.  However, if people can obtain health insurance from other distribution channels, the exchange will need to establish policies and procedures that minimize adverse selection.

One way to mitigate the risk of adverse selection would be to require health insurers to combine all of their individual and small group members into a single risk pool for the purpose of establishing premiums.  This is the approach taken in Massachusetts. An individual who purchases a health plan through the Connector is quoted a premium that is based on each health carrier’s individual and small group book of business, including individual and small group members who purchase coverage outside of the Connector.  The carriers do not establish separate risk pools for each distribution channel.

An alternative—or complementary— approach would be for states to establish a risk adjustment mechanism that would help protect health plans that cover a disproportionate share of high-cost people by shifting funds from health plans that cover a greater percentage of low-cost people. While not easily accomplished, risk adjustment can help minimize the carriers’ inclination to control costs by avoiding older and/or sicker individuals; and can help minimize carriers’ financial exposure, particularly for smaller carriers who might not have a book of business large enough to offset a large share of high-cost enrollees.

As noted in the preceding section, many of the 1990’s versions of health purchasing cooperatives failed because they attracted relatively poor risk and competed against insurers and other distribution channels that were able to offer consumers lower priced health plans.  That experience— although not identical to the exchange models being considered today—offers a few cautionary lessons with regard to mitigating adverse selection: (1) rating rules should be applied consistently inside and outside the exchange; (2) carriers’ underwriting rules should not vary significantly across distribution channels; and (3) brokers play a key role in the marketplace and can influence both the volume and the types of people who purchase coverage through the exchange.

The Role of Health Insurance Brokers

Although health insurance brokers’ level of involvement in the individual and small group markets may vary from state to state, they generally play an influential and critical role in the distribution of health insurance across the country. Brokers serve as the de facto benefits office for many small businesses, providing firms with a range of services, including assistance with health insurance, disability coverage, life insurance, and other ancillary lines of coverage.

Business owners rely on brokers to sort through their health insurance options, provide health plan recommendations at the time of renewal, and serve as their agents throughout the year in dealings with insurers. As noted above, small group brokers in many markets often use intermediaries to provide back-office support before, during, and after enrollment. The intermediaries perform administrative functions that are typically handled by large employers’ human resources office and/or by the health carriers.

How to utilize brokers and how they fit into the outreach and enrollment program for the exchange will be one of the more important decisions made by exchange administrators.  California’s experience in this regard is illuminating. The Health Insurance Plan of California (HIPC) attempted to minimize the role of brokers by setting its broker commissions below the prevailing small group rates and allowing employers to avoid paying commissions altogether by purchasing coverage directly from the HIPC.

As a result, brokers reacted by not promoting the HIPC as an option for small employers—which severely impacted enrollment—and plan administrators discovered that servicing the small groups without brokers was more costly than they expected.  The HIPC reversed course, adjusted their broker fees so that they were comparable to those paid in the small group market, and eliminated the financial incentive offered to small employers who purchased coverage directly from the HIPC.6

The key lesson from California’s experience, as well as the experience of other purchasing cooperatives across the country, is to recognize that brokers play a prominent and important role among small employers.  They often have long-standing and trusting relationships with their clients, and they provide information at the ground level about health insurance options.  Determining how best to leverage the expertise of health insurance brokers —and to make an effort to include them in the outreach and enrollment program —will prove invaluable to exchange administrators.

The Exchange in the Context of the Current Market

As suggested in the first few sections of this Issue Brief, understanding the current health insurance market will be critical to designing an effective exchange that addresses gaps in coverage and improves the health insurance market.  These gaps may be similar across many parts of the country, but market conditions will vary and may be quite different in each state.  Much like the “first do no harm” maxim that medical students are taught, policymakers must be mindful of how the exchange will fit into the current market and how it can operate most efficiently and effectively.

With regard to the exchange’s subsidized health insurance program: how will the premium subsidies and eligibility rules be structured so as to reach the target population and avoid crowd out?  Can existing public subsidy programs be administered by, and/or consolidated within, the exchange?  Is it possible and optimal to utilize existing infrastructure and/or state agencies to handle the eligibility determination process for those newly eligible for premium assistance?

Within the commercial market, the focus of the exchange should be on complementing —not simply replicating —existing functionality and capabilities. Is there a central point, or points, of access for information that allows consumers to compare health insurers and health plans?  What types of information may be lacking and can be filled by the exchange?  How can the exchange drive administrative efficiencies and help streamline the enrollment process?  How will the exchange interact with the state’s health insurance regulator?

Conclusion

While it is likely that the federal health reform law will set guidelines for the operation of state-based exchanges, there will be a host of state-specific policy and administrative decisions that will need to be made in order to effectively and efficiently implement an exchange.  These decisions will influence whether the exchange can help meet the objective of increasing access to affordable health insurance for individuals and small businesses.  Setting the rules for health insurers to participate, providing consumers with relevant and useful information to make informed decisions, streamlining administrative processes, and shifting the insurance market from a competition based on avoiding risk into a competition based on price and quality will take time.

In establishing an exchange, policymakers must be mindful of the particular market conditions that exist in their own state. They will need to engage a broad cross-section of stakeholders—some with competing interests—in order to craft a program that improves the delivery of health insurance.

In some ways the exchange has become a sort of Rorschach test, with people making very different predictions—and having different expectations—about its value and how it can help transform the health insurance market…or not. While an exchange can be a useful vehicle for delivering health insurance and improving competition, major changes to the health insurance markets, and any attempt to lower the cost of health care, will require much more fundamental and substantial health care restructuring than anything an exchange might provide.

About the Author

Bob Carey is the principal of RLCarey Consulting, a health and welfare benefits consultancy that specializes in health insurance reform, in both the public and private markets, health benefits analytics and design, and health and welfare vendor procurements.

Previously, Mr. Carey was director of planning and development for the Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority, an independent authority established pursuant to Massachusetts’ landmark health reform law of 2006 to expand access to affordable health insurance for Commonwealth residents.  In this role, Mr. Carey worked closely with the executive director and the board of the Health Connector to implement new health insurance programs, including designing public and commercial health benefit plans, as well as developing health care financing arrangements.

In addition, Mr. Carey served for several years as the director of policy and program management for the Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission, the state agency responsible for providing health and welfare benefits to over 300,000 state and municipal employees, retirees, and their dependents.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Enrique Martinez-Vidal and Isabel Friedenzohn from the State Coverage Initiatives program for their helpful comments and suggestions. He also gratefully acknowledges Amy Lischko from Tufts University for her helpful comments and insights.

Endnotes
1     Fronstin, P. and M. Ross. “Addressing Health Care Market Reform Through an Insurance Exchange: Essential Policy Components, the Public Plan Option, and Other Issues to Consider,” Employee Benefit Research Institute, Issue Brief 330, June 2009.
2     For additional information, see http://www.census. gov/hhes/www/hlthins/hlthins.html, www.mass. gov/dhcfp, and http://bluecrossfoundation.org/ Policy-and-Research/Roadmap-to-Coverage.aspx.
3     Children of parents eligible for Commonwealth Care are typically covered by the state’s Medicaid program.
4     The Commonwealth Care program has three “plan types,” with different premiums and co­payment schedules, based on the income category of the enrollee.  The plan type for higher-income enrollees charges higher co-payments than the plan type available to lower-income enrollees.
5     For a comprehensive review of the experience of these health purchasing cooperatives, see Wicks,
E. et al. “Barriers to Small-Group Purchasing Cooperatives: Purchasing Health Coverage for Small Employers,” Economic and Social Research Institute, March 2000.
6     Ibid.

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Cancel Your Cobra If Your Healthy!

Cobra is great if your sick, even if your not it can sometimes be appealing especially if you are over 50.  But don’t fall into the trap of sticking with Cobra!  Let me tell you a little story that was just told to me yesterday by a potential client.

In Utah where the economy is flailing under the weight of this recession the construction industry has been hit most painfully as you can guess.  And this poor guy got laid off, and being that he was over 50 he elected Cobra.  Why?  Because the Cobra insurance plan came in cheaper for him.  This is usually not the case but can happen when you work at a large company and are over 50 at a company with where the majority of the workforce is younger males.  The older guy gets the benefit of the same rate class that the younger guys get.  But this article is not about group health insurance premiums.

What is most sad, is that he was perfectly healthy at the time he elected Cobra and could have had his choice of Utah health insurance companies.  Within a few months he developed cancer, and about a year after that, his Cobra expired.  Now he is left with only one decision, go on a Cobra HIPAA conversion plan where the premiums are usually close to the 3 times the average health insurance premium.

So he called us yesterday and we gave him some solid advice but basically he left us searching for loopholes which we found of course, but many other people aren’t so lucky.  This is why it is critical that you not take a Cobra if you can qualify for an individual health insurance plan.

I can go on and tell some even more gruesome stories of pain and suffering caused by Cobra, but will instead just give a piece of solid advice.  Call us at 888-803-5917 for help figuring out the best coverage for you.  We are happy to help you even if there is no commission involved, because frankly if we don’t do it no one else will.  Seriously no one cares about your problems.  I can tell you all the places that this guy called before reaching us and how awful the advice he received was, if he received any help at all.  We will take the time with  you to explain all of your options and are the only brokerage in this country that know everything about health coverage from Medicaid, to free clinics, to Cobra, and all state health insurance laws as well.

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Aetna Thinks Health Reform Should Include Candy

Aetna’s president was recently interviewed and came down hard on our system of health care in this country.  Which is ironic of course as they profit so blatantly from our mismanged care system.

What is his chief complaint?  I would have guessed it to be something like rising health care costs are symptomatic of fraud and mismanagement.  But instead he targeted transparency in his summation.

Part of the problem he outlined including the contracts that Aetna is forced to sign with medical providers include gag orders which prevent Aetna from disclosing the contracts to the public.

Aetna and the other major health insurance companies are under increasing heat to justify their rate increases which I guess they can’t in that it would violate their contracts with providers.

A recent study of two cities in Texas by a Harvard surgeon found that in McAllen, Texas where health care costs are much higher than El Paso, there is no significant difference in outcomes.

Due to the scapegoating of the health insurance industry, people tend to blame the rising costs on them instead of the hospitals and doctors that the costs originate from.

Aetna for its part is jumping on the bandwagon by introducing new programs that test pay-for-performance models  most involve financial incentives for health care providers but also include pay fines for bad results.

A great point is that Aetna is raising premiums for people in its individual health plans and furhter described the individual market as deteriorating. It “has been in decline over a long time. In New York it took three years.

He went on to point to the failure of the individual market in New York which is a risk pool which many decide not to participate in.  And looking at health insurance premiums in New York, there can be no doubt as to the direness of health reform in this battered market.

The health-reform bills need a stronger coverage requirement so people won’t make a “rational” decision to pay the penalty instead of buying health insurance. “I think the individual mandate as currently structured is incredibly weak,” Bertolini said. “The result is it’s going to exacerbate the current problems in the individual and micro-group markets,” he said, referring to coverage for groups with fewer than 10 people in them. Much is riding on how much latitude the federal government gives states to enforce such a mandate, he said. “That could put this whole bill in the balance as to whether it will be successful.” Of course, insurers stand to gain as many as 30 million new customers if health reform passes and extends coverage as planned.

The only way the health insurance companies can control health insurance premiums is when they have a large market share and can forcibly keep down reimbursements.  When there is a greater choice in the network it leads to higher costs especially when you consider that when the doctor is popular or a hospital is a must for the insurance company, they must cave into whatever contracts the provider demands.

When the market is dominated on the other hand by a prominent company they can simply get rid of the provider.  Aetna has had to include pay raises so to speak for medical providers of more than 20% to large hospital networks.

In Connecticut for example the hospital Hartford had requested a 50% rate increase over three years, Bertolini said. When providers refused to accept Aetna’s lower offer, Aetna ended the contract and sent a letter to its members notifying them of the hospital’s exclusion from its network, which was to have become effective Jan. 1. (Patients with ongoing treatment were grandfathered in until a certain date, and new patients could still receive care there but at the higher out-of-network rates.) “You have to draw the line somewhere,” Bertolini said.

Hartford Hospital providers ended up accepting lower increases of 9%, 9% and 7% over three years, half of what they were looking for, and are now back in the network, he said. Aetna estimates 180,000 members would have been impacted if the termination had gone through.

Finally,  Bertolini was asked  if health insurers were any closer to settling on a standard and easier-to-understand explanation of benefits form, or EOB. He said he’d like to “get rid” of both EOBs and health-insurance ID cards in favor of an all-digital platform.

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Obama Is On Intellectual Vacation

I get to my office this morning and start combing the health reform news and health insurance updates when I find an article from the New York Times  about regulating health insurance companies premium increases and as I sit there reading it, I am amazed by how completely wrong he is about his main supposition.

His plan is to keep health insurance premiums down by regulating insurance companies through Federal officials.  So in effect, the Federal Government would keep health insurance premiums low, while the state governments bailed out all the failing health insurance companies.

What am I talking about?  Health insurance premiums are not rising because of greed, they are rising because medical costs are.  There should be no doubt about this.  All you have to do is to look at the financial statements of health insurance companies or at their profit ratios to know that they haven’t changed.  In fact most states don’t legally allow them to change.

Don’t get me wrong, I am not in bed with the health insurance companies, in fact I think that a few of them need to be excessively fined from Humana to even Blue Cross.  But, health care costs are rising which is raising health insurance premiums not the reverse.

Again this is not an opinion or a blog journal this is an economic fact.  Health insurance premiums reflect the prics charged by doctors and hospitals.  And profit ratios are legally controlled as we know from the Blue Cross of California debacle.

So what would this stupid law do?  It would make state governments be handicapped in regulating insurance companies.

Most of the state insurance commissioners are all in agreement that when enforcing rate increases, the solvency and financial data needs to be considered.  In other words the claims history has to dictate rate increases.

Underwriting and actuarial services are fundamentally even more complicated as benefits also control premiums.  The problem with this new “idea” of the President is health care costs will still be accelerating at an unprecedented pace.

Insurance commissioners are extremely concerned that this would make many insurers insolvent which might help hold down rates but it would end up leaving insurance companies unable to pay claims!

“You are not necessarily helping the consumer if you keep rates artificially low.  What’s worse for the consumer: having a premium increase or having to pay the full amount of a medical expense because the company is out of business?”

Not only that but what do you think is the central tenet in the President’s health reform bill?  A Health Insurance Rate Authority.  This is actually bordering on incompetent legislation.  Does he really think this is the answer to health care problems?

The only reasonable answer is of course is a single payer system which would not only fix the precarious health insurance situation but would also fix Medicare, Medicaid, and the economy as a whole.

Mr. Obama has cited his proposal for a Health Insurance Rate Authority as one of the most significant elements of his plan to remake the nation’s health care system.

The facts have not stopped idiot lawmakers from ganging up on the easy prey like Blue Cross of California which even with their 39% rate increase will still have the lowest premiums in the market.  This is politics as its worst.

While it is easy to agree with the President that rates are high, the real task would be to rein in costs which could be done in any number of ways.  But sadly, as reprehensible as some of these health insurance companies are, they are in fact innocent of the charges being leveled to advance the political careers of mindless politicians.

The individual insurance market is notoriously volatile, and Susan E. Voss, the Iowa insurance commissioner, said she had seen some companies paying out 50 percent more in claims than they collected in premiums for some policies in that market.

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Abortions Hurt More Then Babies

With the health reform issue coming to a head, it is beginning to look like it might come down to abortion.  The Democrats and Obama have only one good chance left at passing this massive “reform” bill which is through a process called reconciliation.  Of course reconciliation was not made for this kind of thing, but tell that to Republicans who have used this trick to pass their silly bills to perfection.

Abortion and Health Reform the Battle Rages On

But strangely, the abortion issue keeps coming up in the negotiations.  What does abortion have to do health insurance or health reform?  Well I am not exactly sure.  And I have been writing and reading about health reform for months now and reporting on it to you, dear faithful reader.  (I used the singular because I am not sure there is more then one of you, thanks dear sweet wife!)

And if this thing passes or if it doesn’t pass the Democrats will pay a steep price for it.  If it doesn’t pass, it will be one long year wasted.  If it does pass it will be through back room dealings which will anger many Americans come voting time.

So lets unwind this abortion thing.  House Democrats who dislike abortion are resisting funding restrictions for abortion that for some reason the Senate health reform bill included.  So why not pull it out?  Because reconciliation means that the House needs to pass the Senate bill without amending the thing on abortion.

Of course there will be some changes but abortion is not one of them.

Pelosi who agrees with me is quite angered that abortion is possibly going to kill more then just unborn fetuses.  She said, “‘This is not about abortion, this is a bill about providing quality affordable health care for all Americans.”

But Bart Stupak who has made big headlines of late and a few of his fellow House members have vocally proclaimed that they will not vote for this Senate bill unless the abortion language is replaced.  The House bill only passed last time because Pelosi allowed Stupak to incorporate his strict abortion funding restriction.  So the House bill (also passed) would have been great for Stupak who is holding his vote until the bill clamps down on abortion funding.

And Stupak believes that the House will not pass the Senate bill without him and his colleagues who are not going to change the vote.  But his buddies over there might not stick with him this time, which is the only chance that the Democrats have of passing this bill through reconciliation.

So what is going on? The Senate bill says health insurance plans operating in a new consumer marketplace can cover abortion, but it may only be paid for with private premiums. Money from federal subsidies would have to be strictly segregated from any funds used to pay for abortion. Consumers would have to write two checks to their insurance plan, one for the regular premium, the other for abortion coverage.

Abortion rights supporters say both measures impose unreasonable restrictions on women’s access to a legal medical procedure now widely covered by health insurance.

Abortion rights supporters backed down once the last time. This time, if House Democratic leaders can’t line up enough votes without placating Stupak, it’s unclear how they will get the abortion language changed.

Pelosi says it can’t be done in a companion package that would move through both chambers as part of deal worked out with Obama. Under congressional rules, the elements of that package would have to have a significant budget impact. A third piece of legislation may be needed.

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